Subsea systems designed for continuous operation on the seabed are required to demonstrate very high reliability and it is not uncommon to encounter requirements that state a 10 year Mean Time Between Failure (MTBF) and 20 year design life.
Introduction
With the increasing cost of recovery and advancements in complex subsea production and process systems the reliability of subsea systems has never been more critical.
Subsea systems designed for continuous operation on the seabed are often required to demonstrate very high reliability. It is not uncommon to encounter requirements that state a 20 year design life. While the environment on the seabed is in general quite benign and predictable, the extreme duration over which reliability needs to be demonstrated becomes an impediment. Given the high field customization and consequently small numbers of identical systems implies that statistical data suffers from small sample sizes. Further, the projects are often fast-track, leaving insufficient time for a realistic field test.
Over the years, many technical solutions have been developed, spanning several industries, where experts have tackled the issues related to highly available systems. These techniques have been successfully applied in the relevant areas, and are consequently of much interest to the Subsea industry. Schlumberger has also done a lot of work on reliability engineering, both on downhole retrievable tools in harsh conditions, and more recently on permanent installations. Much of this effort is still ongoing, as project teams across several technology centers try to achieve higher reliability targets on increasingly complex tools.
Currently, production control and monitoring systems are qualified to the ISO 13628 Part 6 [1] standard for use subsea. This standard details the levels of temperature, shock and vibration testing a subsea electronic and hydraulic control system must undergo including an Extended Screening Test (ESS) on each system delivered. However, compliance with the standard and successful completion of system qualification does not equate to a reliable product.
Overview

System Description
This reliability work was performed as part of the development of the Schlumberger Subsea Monitoring and Control (SMC) system which is an open architecture, subsea surveillance system enabling advanced seabed and downhole sensors while reducing interface issues and custom engineering. Over 30 SMC systems have been successfully delivered to date with over 150,000 hours of operation and zero failures in the field.*
The Schlumberger subC-pod module is part of the SMC system which facilitates subsea surveillance for integrity, production, and process systems. It is a communications and power hub that enables surface equipment to communicate directly with subsea and downhole equipment and that extends the host facility communications network to the seabed. It also provides local communications links for internal interface cards and external I/O modules, including production sensors, flowmeters, and sand detectors.
The module enables a subsea LAN to be established that connects the operator to the reservoir and the extended wellbore system. The open (plug-and-play), flexible system is IWIS compliant, so that Schlumberger and third-party instrumentation can interact seamlessly.
The subC-pod module contains the processor, I/O components, optical or electrical modems, internal diagnostics, and expandable nonproprietary capacity for third-party devices. A single power supply supports all the electronics within the module.
The module has been designed, developed, manufactured and tested in the Schlumberger SRC centre in Rosharon, Texas. The electronics module is currently being used on a number of subsea pump and production control manifolds developed and built by Framo Engineering in Norway.
Product Lifecycle Process
Schlumberger's Product Lifecycle Management Process (PLMP), developed and refined over many years, controls Feature: Reliable Subsea Equipment product development during the various stages from Concept through Feasibility, Development, Experimental Prototype (EXP), Engineered Product (ENP -Field Unit), Commercialization and Sustaining. The design approach emphasizes product modularity and standardization. This brings benefits of operational flexibility, reliability and long term sustainability to our clients.
Although subsea systems are notorious for customized solutions, the process promotes the development of customized product families, rather than producing a myriad of unsustainable specials.
A development process in the project lifecycle has been implemented to help engineering teams in managing reliability targets from the very beginning.
The engineering process has steps for Design, Reliability Analysis, Accelerated Testing, Manufacturing and Certification during each phase of the product lifecycle and involves interactions and interdependencies between the various stakeholders of the system throughout its development lifetime.
A Thermal Analysis was performed on a software model to identify any hot spots, eliminate high temperatures, and improve overall heat dissipation. The unique design of the Schlumberger subsea module allows heat transfer from the PSU, the component generating the greatest heat, directly through the steel housing to seawater during operation. This allows the system to be designed to operate and monitor high power seabed and downhole equipment without risk of internal heat issues.
A Mission Profile has been developed detailing the environmental conditions encountered by the surface equipment and subsea modules during their operational life including manufacturing and test, shipping, storage, installation, operations, retrieval and obsolescence. The environmental conditions identified by the Mission Profile form the basis of the component and system qualification tests. .
Reliability Modeling and Analysis
As part of the iterative design process, a full Reliability Analysis was performed on the complete system architecture including surface and subsea modules to identify critical components and how the use of redundant components and systems can increase overall system availability.
The reliability program included: · Reliability Block Diagram (RBD) · Failure Mode Effects and Analysis (FMEA) · Mean-Time Between Failure (MTBF) calculation · FTA -Fault Tree Analysis (FTA).
Commercial software was used to perform a full system analysis including umbilical, surface EPU, optical connectors, etc. based on the MIL-HDBK-217 [2] . Multiple options of subsea module component configuration and overall system were analysed to determined methods for improving overall reliability.
Care must be taken when using MTBF data from third party vendors in system reliability analysis. It is important to clarify the source and method of calculation of the MTBF value and confirm the temperature reference, adjustments and MIL-HDBK-217 definition used in each case. The MTBFs calculated for a number of different configurations of the subsea surveillance module showed that a dual redundant system had an expected life of close to 18 years operation.
Although the MTBF calculation provided a level of confidence in the design of the system, it is important to remember that the figure is purely analytical and not based on actual component or circuit board failure data in most cases and only a prediction based on BOM and component MTBF data.
The system Reliability Analysis also provided information on the Reliability Importance vs. time of each component in the system. This provided useful information on the most critical components in the system and how redundancy could increase overall system reliability.
A major design change which resulted from the Reliability Analysis was to make the subsea module PSU redundant with completely separate circuits providing both AC to DC conversion and internal and external DC supplies. This meant that the subsea module would continue to operate in the event of a failure of any power component in the PSU.
As a continuation of the Reliability Analysis performed on the Schlumberger surveillance system, the results provided input into the definition of reliability tests to be performed on the assembly and sub-assemblies. Reliability tests can be categorized as Qualitative tests (for design improvement) and Quantitative tests (for reliability demonstration). Figure 3 shows the process flow and tests for both the Subsea Data Hub (SDH) modules and Topside Data Hub (TDH) equipment.
Additionally, a Failure Reporting, Analysis, and Correction Action System (FRACAS) closed-loop reporting system has been implemented providing a system that supports failure reporting, failure investigation/failure root cause, and corrective actions taken. The Feature: Reliable Subsea Equipment system ensures that the necessary failure information is acquired and action taken to remove related future failures. The system provides a process to track reliability of product through its life.
Qualification and Testing
The qualification tests are designed to demonstrate that the hardware meets all environmental requirements, and likely sustain the manufacturing, shipping, and installation stresses while performing reliably in the expected operating environment.
The qualification and reliability tests are to identify potential weaknesses within the product and also to demonstrate that the product will perform as intended throughout the targeted life of the product as defined in the Mission Profile for the product.
Prototypes and experimental testing provide a means to determine the lower bound of system reliability by exposing design and manufacturing deficiencies in the design. The most significant of these can be found at a relatively early phase in the development process by encouraging early (and frequent) prototyping where possible, followed by HALT testing. HALT (Highly Accelerated Life Testing) is an increasing popular technique widely used in the industry to increase system robustness.
ISO Compliance Tests
The ISO 13628 Part 6 standard is applicable to subsea control and monitoring systems. It defines a series of shock, vibration and temperature tests which must be undergone by subsea housings or frames and a second set of tests to be undergone by individual internal printed circuit boards and sub-assemblies to be compliant with the standard.
Prior to the Reliability Testing, the Schlumberger components and system all successfully passed the ISO qualification tests. Additionally, all manufactured units shipped to the field undergo vibration and temperature testing as part of an Extended Stress Screen (ESS) as per the ISO specification.
Qualitative Tests / HALT
The module assembly was subjected to the HALT process to uncover design and/or process weaknesses. During HALT, the assembly was subjected to progressively higher stress levels brought on by thermal dwells, vibration, rapid thermal transitions and combined environments. The intent was to subject the assembly to stimuli well beyond the expected field environments to determine the operating and destruct limits of the product. Failures, which typically show up in the field over a period of time at much lower stress levels, are quickly discovered while applying high stress conditions over a short period of time.
The HALT finds the operating and destruct limits for a product by using thermal step stress, rapid thermal transitions, vibration step stress, and combined environments of temperature and multi-axis, 6 degree-of-freedom, vibration. After reaching these limits, the goal is to fix the weak links and stress the equipment even further to expand the limits as much as possible.
The objective of this testing is to quickly identify weaknesses within the product that would pose significant reliability problems through life operation. Thermal and vibration step stress testing identifies product weakness as well as operational and destruct margins. This vibration stress generates multi-axis and broad bandwidth frequency excitation stress, and is additionally enhanced by accelerated with fast rate of change thermal cycling. These tests are performed to evaluate the detrimental effects of temperature and random vibration and determine if equipment can operate properly during and after these stressors without experiencing physical damage, or deterioration in performance.
HALT is primarily a margin discovery process. In order to ruggedize the product, the root cause of each of failure needs to be determined and the problems corrected until the fundamental limit of the technology for the product can be reached. This process yields the widest possible margin between product capabilities and the environment in which it will operate, thus increasing the product's reliability, reducing the number of field returns and realizing longterm savings.
Additionally electrical stresses were applied during the aforementioned environmental stresses including varying input voltage amplitude; varying output load, voltage and current transients, noisy power.
The intent of the test is to subject the DUT to extreme stress, thermal mechanical and electrical. The stress levels used are much higher than what the system is likely to experience during use, but the tests are very effective. They expose subtle design errors in the systems that are likely to go unnoticed in reduced stress levels. HALT also utilizes simultaneous excitation, for example random vibration with thermal cycling, and these tests often reveal failure modes not brought out by more traditional tests. While HALT testing as such does not result in a final reliability number for the system, but it is very effective in increasing the overall robustness of the design.
The operating and destruct limits discovered during HALT on this equipment can be used to develop an effective Highly Accelerated Stress Screen (HASS) for manufacturing which will quickly detect any process flaws or new weak links without taking significant life out of the product. The HASS process will ensure that the reliability gains achieved through HALT will be maintained in future production.
Quantitative Accelerated Life Testing (ALT)
Unlike the HALT testing detailed in the section above, ALT consists of test(s) designed to quantify the life characteristics of the product, component or system under normal use conditions and thereby provide reliability information. Reliability information can include the determination of the probability of failure of the product under use conditions, mean life under use conditions and projected returns and warranty costs. It can also be used to assist in the performance of risk assessments, design comparisons, etc.
Accelerated Life Testing was conducted to demonstrate that the product will perform reliably throughout the defined life expectancy period.
This accelerated temperature and humidity test is a continuous stress test conducted to demonstrate that the product will perform reliably throughout the defined life expectancy period.
The calculation of temperature and humidity acceleration factors is based on Arrhenius equation for temperature acceleration and on the Hallberg-Peck equation for the additional humidity stress (see below for equation and input factors). 
Feature: Reliable Subsea Equipment
As the stress used in an accelerated test becomes higher, the required test duration decreases. However, as the stress level moves farther away from the use conditions, the uncertainty in the extrapolation increases. Confidence intervals provide a measure of the uncertainty in extrapolation. Chi-Square Distribution Function tables were used to determine a confidence level of 90% based on the allowed number of failures during the test.
Testing was performed successfully to demonstrate reliability to 438,000 hours, or 50 years.*
Obsolescence
The issue of obsolescence is a major one in the subsea controls and monitoring industry. With shorter component lifetimes in the electronics industry and fast pace of technology development, obsolescence quickly becomes an issue for subsea systems which may be in operation for >20 years [3] .
Many subsea equipment suppliers rely on holding stock or lifetime component purchases to ensure identical systems can be manufactured in the future.
As component lifetimes shorten and stocks become limited, this strategy is high risk and can result in expensive and fast-track redesign when obsolete components are discovered.
Additionally, the introduction of legislature such as the Restriction of Hazardous Substances (RoHS) requires suppliers to redesign existing electronics sub-assemblies and assemblies to meet the new directives. This redesign may result in compatibility issues, reduced reliability, unusable lifetime stock as well as the need to re-qualify and perform reliability testing.
A pro-active approach must be taken with obsolescence. Bills of Materials for new developments must be routinely checked against global obsolescence databases and time of life for components recorded against development and project timelines. Part-Change and Part-Discontinuation notices from suppliers can allow long term planning for obsolescence management. Replacement parts or re-designs of boards can be planned and integrated in the product lifecycle.
The mitigation of obsolete components may depend on the expected quantity of systems developed where obsolescence on small volume manufacturing can be solved through stock or replacement parts whereas larger volumes may require re-design.
The issue of obsolescence becomes even more important with long term development programs and testing for new subsea electronics components. In the worst cases, it is possible for a component to become obsolete during the design, test and qualification process.
Results
The Schlumberger subsea surveillance module has undergone extensive accelerated life testing to determine the stress limits of the system. The testing demonstrated that the subsea module could continue to operate significantly outwith the limits specified by the ISO standard. The diagram and graphs below show the stress limits for temperature and vibration testing until soft failure † .
The graphs show the equipment was still functioning normally at -50ºC and +80ºC during the temperature testing and was able to withstand up to 40G (RMS) vibration during temperature cycling between -50ºC and 80ºC (at a rate of 5ºC per minute). † 'Soft Failures' are points where the system fails to function properly when under stress but returns to operating normally when the stress is reduced or removed. Hard failures are observed when the system fails to function properly when under stress and does not return to operating normally when the stress is reduced or removed.
The ALT testing of the system has involved the continuous stress testing of the system under accelerated conditions over a number of months. At the end of the successful test, the module had undergone over 50 years simulated life without failure.*
Conclusion & Lessons Learned
The high focus on reliability and extended testing within the Schlumberger Subsea group has yielded very positive results. A number of valuable lessons on component selection, system design and packaging were learned and implemented to produce a final reliable product. Additionally, a number of important points noted during the process are detailed below. · It is important not to rely too heavily on calculated MTBF results from analytical data -issues with weighting factors, temperature corrections, non-validated data, erroneous data and use of different environments across suppliers can create problems or confusion. 
Feature: Reliable Subsea Equipment
The analytical analysis should be used as a guide and for comparison between different system architectures, identification of critical components and as an input to HASS/HALT testing · Use established internal and external procedures and design rules where applicable. The Subsea group were able to apply existing Schlumberger standards for electronic board design, component selection and interfacing which are currently used on wireline and drilling product lines to the subsea electronics assemblies. These documented procedures and design rules will be even more important in the future for reliable design due to the high turnover of engineers and aging workforce in the subsea industry. · Due to the high costs of iterative design, development, qualification and accelerated testing it is vital that the design and component selection is frozen for a minimum number of years. Any component change will require retesting of the component, subassembly and even assembly which can be costly. · The issue of obsolescence must be managed as part of the project development lifecycle. To mitigate obsolescence issues, a proactive approach should be adopted and regular component watches must be carried out during the development and testing of any new component or system to ensure the qualified and reliable component developed through the lifecycle can be supported. · The HALT process alone will not improve the reliability of the product. The root cause of any failures noted need to be determined and the problems corrected until the fundamental limit of the technology for the product can be reached. This process will yield the widest possible margin between product capabilities and the environment in which it will operate, thus increasing the product's reliability, reducing the number of field returns and realizing long-term savings. · In the tests carried out, which are detailed in this report, the same assembly and sub-assemblies were used during all the stress testing which may result in fatigue or induce failures in the DUT giving erroneous results on subsequent tests. To generate more accurate results during HALT testing, multiple DUTs should be used to ensure that each test is performed on a component or system which has not previously undergone stress testing. · An extension of the HALT testing performed is to carry out the stress testing on the DUT to its Destruct Limit. The benefits of performing destructive testing is that it can help to identify the weakest components of the system however the testing costs increase significantly as multiple DUTs are required to test each upper and lower limit. · A number of operators have developed or are developing Technology Readiness Levels (TRLs) programmes to ensure new subsea technologies are fit for purpose, qualified and demonstrated as reliable prior to installation on the seabed or downhole. Standard methods of recording and reporting supplier product and system TRL levels should be adopted to speed up the process of introducing new technologies subsea. · It is important that all members of the Design, Development, Testing and Manufacturing team as well as Management within the company understand the nature, basic theory and practice of Reliability Testing.
· Data collection of test and field failures must be carried out and a process put in place for the recording, analysis and storage of all critical failure information. The existing Reliability Analysis must then be updated with any new component or system failure data. · An API Recommended Practice has been developed for Reliability and Technical Risk Management of Subsea Production Systems [4] . This Practice has been developed to support Operators, Contractors and Suppliers in the development of reliability strategies and plans for subsea systems. The practice provides detailed guidance on analysis techniques and processes, management of reliability data and characterization. · The reliability of subsea control systems for critical production control such as tree valves and downhole safety valves can be improved by removing as many complex components and electronics as possible from the production control system and placing them in a retrievable, parallel, non-critical surveillance system. This methodology also assists with obsolescence issues within the production control system.
* Figures updated since date of publication
